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COMMENTS
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona:
A

CONSUMERS' RIGHTS INTERPRETATION OF THE FIRST

AMENDMENT ENDS BANS ON LEGAL ADVERTISING
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,' delivered an opinion that will prove critical to new developments in
first amendment adjudication. The Court held that blanket suppression of legal advertising does not violate the Sherman Act,
but does abridge first amendment rights. By so holding, the Court
confounded its historic valuation of speech categories and significantly enhanced its evolving protection of consumers' rights.
The legal advertising controversy, which in the two years
prior to Bates had stirred the American bar to unparalleled debate and self-analysis,' was finally channeled into a constitutional question of the first order by two Phoenix, Arizona lawyers,
John R. Bates and Van O'Steen. On February 22, 1976, the attorneys placed an advertisement in the Arizona Republic announcing fees for certain routine services provided by their legal clinic.
They were well aware that they were violating a disciplinary rule
of the Arizona Supreme Court.4 The state bar initiated discipli97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
2 See, e.g., Smith, Making the Availability of Legal Services Better Known, 62

A.B.A.J. 855 (1976) (winner of the ABA's Ross essay competition for 1976). The debate
was ushered in by Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), in which the Court
held that legal services may be subject to federal antitrust laws. Goldfarb did not directly
address the question of legal advertising; nevertheless, the fact that the legal profession
could be brought within the compass of the Sherman Act, and thus its surrounding case
law which holds that restraints on advertising are potentially illegal restraints on trade,
led to the inescapable conclusion that traditional bans against the advertising of legal
services were open to challenge. The question was finally settled in Bates, where the Court
concluded that restrictions on legal advertising do not violate federal antitrust laws. 97
S. Ct. at 2696-98. See note 83 infra.
2 The advertisement is reproduced in Appendix I.
ARIZ. SuP. CT. R. 29(a) (Supp. 1977). The rule provides in part:
(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate,
or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through
newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or televison announcements,
display advertisements in the city or telephone directories or other means of
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nary proceedings and recommended that the attorneys be suspended for one week. 5 On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court
affirmed the constitutionality of the disciplinary rule6 but reduced the sanction to censure because the attorneys had acted
"in good faith to test the constitutionality" of the rule.7 Bates and
O'Steen brought an immediate appeal to the United States Supreme Court, which had hinted broadly in two prior cases 8 that
it was prepared to decide the legal advertising question. The case
proceeded swiftly to oral argument on January 18, 1977, and the
groundwork was laid for the dismantling of one of the oldest canons of professional conduct in Anglo-American law.
That dismantling came about on June 27, 1977. In an opinion
canvassing the justifications traditionally advanced by the bar in
support of advertising bans, Justice Blackmun, writing for a 5-4
majority,' held that the disciplinary rule was an unconstitutional
abridgment of first amendment rights. The holding, while pointedly narrow, declared all across-the-board bans of legal advertising constitutionally impermissible and presented guidelines for
the promulgation of rules to prevent misleading legal advertisements. 0 In the course of his opinion, Justice Blackmun in effect
upbraided the legal profession for clinging to hidebound justifications for antiquated protectionist practices, and appealed to the
bar to heal itself.
commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his
behalf.
The Arizona rule on attorney advertising, like those of the other states, is borrowed
almost verbatim from the ABA formulation. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPONSIBILrry, DR 2-101(B) (1976).
The proceedings were held pursuant to an official complaint filed by the president
of the State Bar of Arizona. A special committee heard the matter and recommended a
suspension of six months. Upon further review the board of governors of the bar revised
the recommendation to a one-week suspension. 97 S. Ct. at 2695.
In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976).
Id. at 400, 555 P.2d at 646.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
1 Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens joined Justice Blackmun in the
majority opinion. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist filed opinions
concurring in that portion of the majority opinion dealing with the antitrust claim, and
dissenting from the Court's determination on the first amendment claim. Justice Stewart
joined the opinion of Justice Powell.
,0 97 S. Ct. at 2708-09. The holding was limited to newspaper advertising of prices
and availability of certain routine legal services. See text accompanying notes 72-93 infra.
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Bates completes a series of cases which began with Bigelow
v. Virginia."I Although these cases have been noted primarily for
the abolition of the commercial speech doctrine,"2 they are even
more significant in their cautious development of a constitutional
basis for the affirmative protection of advertising as first amendment speech. Bates was preceded by an intriguing permutation
of doctrine that gradually gathered definition. The essence of that
doctrine is that, in the interest of informed decisionmaking, the
public has a compelling first amendment right to receive commercial information.
Bates' ramifications for first amendment methodology and
philosophy could ultimately overshadow the practical effect of its
holding on the subject of legal advertising. The Court expatiated
on a first amendment strict scrutiny test which had earlier
been expressed in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Counci' 3 and Linmark Associates v. City of
Willingboro. 4 This test has taken the form of a rigorously skeptical examination of the acceptability of asserted state justifications for suppressing speech. Bates may signal the Court's intent
to abandon its long tradition of applying a double standard of
preferred and less preferred speech,' 5 and to institute instead a
single strict standard for reviewing any legislation that infringes
upon protected speech. The decision also marks a triumph for the
democratic idealism that prizes an informed polity over the paternalism that values social institutions as stewards of the public
421 U.S. 809 (1975). See text accompanying notes 33-46 infra.
The commercial speech doctrine was enunciated in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52 (1942), and abandoned in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The doctrine held that purely commercial
speech, which included advertising, was entitled to no first amendment protection. See
note 21 infra.
.3 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
" 97 S. Ct. 1614 (1977). See text accompanying notes 69-71 infra.
, A double standard which applied to first amendment protections was articulated
in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Prior to that case,
the Court had been struggling with a long history of judicial preference for economic over
human liberties in several areas, notably due process. Carolene criticized that order of
preferences, and suggested that it be reversed by the establishment of a presumption in
favor of state regulation in the economic area. Bates appears to indicate not a return to a
pre-Carolenescale of values, but a disavowal of a hierarchichal system of first amendment
protections.
2
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interest. In Bates the consumerism of this decade has found an
eloquent statement.
I. THE "SLIPPERY SLOPE" FROM Bigelow TO Bates
As Justice Blackmun emphasized in his majority opinion, 6
the bedrock of the Bates rationale was the Court's repudiation of
the commercial speech doctrine in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.17 Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting in Bates, expressed alarm at this development, arguing
that it placed the Court on a "slippery slope" away from a doctrine that was "constitutionally sound and practically workable."' 8 In fact, the commercial speech doctrine never enjoyed a
great deal of favor with either the Warren or the Burger Court.
After its "casual, almost offhand"'" appearance in Valentine v.
Chrestensen,20 it somehow lingered for thirty-three years as an
adventitious doctrine of convenience, never independently controlling a decision, asserted most often to shore up principal theories, and regularly impugned by the Court's critics.' The eviscer1197 S.
17

Ct. at 2700.

425 U.S. 748 (1976).

97 S. Ct. at 2720 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
So Justice Douglas described the genesis of the commercial speech doctrine. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
316 U.S. 52 (1942).
The commercial speech doctrine's advent in Valentine was accompanied by almost
no explanation other than an implicit warning that commercial motives would deny first
amendment protection to the publication of information. The doctrine was first applied
in three "handbilling" cases: Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943). The last two cases
established a primary motive test by which door-to-door canvassing would be protected
against anti-littering ordinances if it could be shown that the chief purpose of the activity
was the dissemination of ideas or information, or the proselytizing of religion.
Martin broke from this pattern by balancing homeowners' interests in privacy and
burglary prevention against first amendment rights in a religious handbilling context. The
Court found first amendment freedoms paramount, as handbilling was "essential to the
poorly financed causes of little people." 319 U.S. at 146. Martin might be seen as having
presaged Bigelow's balancing test except that the Court continued to employ the motive
analysis initiated in Valentine. In addition, all three cases might well be distinguished as
having been concerned with religious freedoms. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951),
enforces that view. Breard's door-to-door sale of magazine subscriptions was held to be
unprotected, unlike Murdock's sales of religious tracts. Although Breard became the
hallmark of the Valentine motive test, the opinion also employed an alternative-meansof-distribution test: The availability of other methods of obtaining subscriptions to magazines which did not intrude on homeowners' privacy militated toward the reasonableness
of the regulation. It is likely that the commercial speech doctrine did not actually engender the outcome of these four cases, that each was either a religion case, or a time, place,
"
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ation of the Valentine doctrine from Bigelow v. Virginia2 through
Bates should be viewed not only as the step-by-step emancipation
of a previously unprotected category of speech, but as the vehicle
for an expansion of first amendment theory. Bates stands as both
the epitaph of the commercial speech doctrine and the efflorescence of the use of the first amendment to advance consumers'
rights.
The apparatus for this development was the gradual shaping
and manner case, masquerading in freedom-of-expression garb.
After Breard, active use of the doctrine declined, but its availability as an ancillary
theory continued, to the distress of its critics. In three unfortunate opinions, the doctrine
operated as a kind of scapegoat-a supportive argument used to carry the burden of some
questionable results. In Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), pandering of
materials not clearly obscene in themselves stripped the purveyor of first amendment
rights. Though the finding that commercial exploitation is not protected speech certainly
reflects the Valentine-Breardprimary commercial motive test, the opinion was principally
supported by an inference of obscenity derived from the appeal which pandering allegedly
makes to prurient interests. The commercial speech doctrine was mentioned by analogy.
383 U.S. at 474 n.17.
In Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973),
classified advertisements segregated by sex were held to be "classic examples of commercial speech," unprotected, and therefore subject to equal rights regulation. Id. at 385. The
newspaper's argument that such regulation interfered with protected editorial discretion
in selection and layout of the advertisements was rejected. Id. at 387. Pittsburgh Press
would have marked a revival of the doctrine except for the decisive fact that the advertisements were illegal. Id. at 388. The Court, even while relying on the doctrine, forecast its
demise: That "the exchange of information is as important in the commercial realm as in
any other" may, in other contexts, warrant discontinuing "the distinction between commercial and other speech." Id.
In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), decided one term before
Bigelow, a prohibition against political advertisements on bus placards did not trigger first
amendment guarantees. This normally.highly protected public speech, merely because it
was in commercial form, merited only a cursory minimum rationality test. The plurality
opinion was written by Justice Blackmun, who guided the abolition of the commercial
speech doctrine in the Bigelow- Virginia Pharmacy-Bates trilogy. Justice Douglas concurred. Lehman remains inexplicable, an example of the dangers of not discarding obsolete doctrine, but probably aberrational in light of that doctrine's subsequent debasement.
The commercial speech doctrine has controlled the outcome of one or more issues in
a number of state and lower federal court cases. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
446 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir. 1971); Jenness v. Forbes, 351 F. Supp. 88, 96-97 (D.R.I. 1972);
Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821, 825 (W.D. Va. 1969) (an unsuccessful
attack on the same statute ruled unconstitutional in Virginia Pharmacy)(PattersonDrug
Co. is discussed in note 47 infra); United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J.
144, 152, 93 A.2d 362, 366 (1952) (Judge Brennan, prior to his appointment to the United
States Supreme Court, here affirming the lack of all protection for commercial speech);
Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. Sills, 93 N.J. Super. 326, 346, 225 A.2d 728, 739 (1966); HM
Distribs. v. Department of Agriculture, 55 Wis. 2d 261, 272-73, 198 N.W.2d 598, 605 (1972).
- 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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of a standard of review for judging the suppression of commercial
information. The Court experimented with a succession of
tests-analyzing motive, then content, then balancing interests-before evolving a first amendment strict scrutiny capable
of striking bans on legal advertising.
In New York Times v. Sullivan,2 3 the Court made its first
break from the Valentine v. Chrestensen "primary motive" doctrine which had held that speech for the purpose of profit was not
protected.24 Sullivan focused on the unprotected category of libelous speech, not commercial speech. But if Valentine had had any
real clout, the libel issue would not have been reached. The
Times' purpose in publishing the clergymen's advertisement was
primarily commercial: The editors had no voice in the content of
the advertisement, and it was sold in the same quotidian manner
as any other advertising space.25 An application of Valentine
would, therefore, have stripped the advertisement of constitutional protection.2 6 But the Court contrived a content analysis,
characterizing the advertisement not as commercial but editorial
-"for the promulgation of information and ideas . ...,1 By
means of a content analysis, the Court could circumvent the
commercial speech doctrine and reach the desired result.
Sullivan was prematurely heralded as signaling a golden age
in first amendment adjudication;2s the Supreme Court appeared
to have embraced Professor Meiklejohn's thesis that the first
amendment is the mainstay of an enlightened democracy. The
source of this fanfare was the Sullivan content test, by which
speech directed to "public affairs" could be protected despite
"

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

2

316 U.S. at 54. See note 21 supra.

The advertisement was purchased by the Committee to Defend Martin Luther
King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South. It contained a lengthy description of the
tribulations of the civil rights movement in the South, and the resistance of local officials
to the movement. It also appealed for contributions. For a criticism of Sullivan's disposal
of the commercial speech issue, see Schiro, Commercial Speech: The Demise of a
Chimera, 1976 SuP. CT. REv. 45, 60-68.
" See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). See note 21 supra.
21 376 U.S. at 266.
" See, e.g., Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191. Professor Kalven quotes Professor Meikeljohn's response to the Sullivan decision: " 'It is . . .an occasion for dancing in the
streets.'" Id. at 221 n.125.
" See text accompanying notes 123-27 infra.
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defamatory content (absent malice), despite commercial form,
and, implicitly, despite commercial motive.3 0 Subsequent developments have subjected the Meiklejohn thesis to a curious twist
at the hands of the Supreme Court. It has been in the area of
commercial and not political expression that the argument for the
first amendment's service to an informed polity has borne fruit
since Sullivan. 3 Meanwhile a double standard which derogates
commercial speech and elevates political expression, as embodied
in the Sullivan content analysis,32 has withered on the vine.
But eleven years later Justice Blackmun turned to the
Sullivan content analysis when striking the first overt blow
3
against the commercial speech doctrine in Bigelow v. Virginia.
Bigelow, managing editor of a Charlottesville, Virginia newspaper, had been convicted under a state statute making it a misdemeanor to publish, by advertisement or otherwise, any information that would "encourage or prompt the procuring of an abortion or miscarriage.

.

..

" Bigelow's weekly newspaper had car-

ried an advertisement purchased by a New York City abortionreferral agency. The Supreme Court struck down the conviction,
explicitly stating what could have been inferred from Sullivan:
Advertising per se is not unprotected.3 5 In other words, commercial form does not preclude protectable content. Valentine3 was
somewhat incorrectly distinguished, as it would be in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council,3 as having proposed merely time, place, and manner
restrictions, rather than exception from protection for commercial speech.3 8

The Valentine primary motive test surfaced again after Sullivan in Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), and in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). See note 21 supra.
" Justice Brennan, interestingly, has stated that his majority opinion in Sullivan was
not necessarily an expression of the Meiklejohn thesis, but rather a restatement of the
redeeming social importance test he had devised for obscenity cases. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretationof the FirstAmendment, 79 HAv. L. REv.
1, 19 (1965).
12 In a sense the Supreme Court has not abandoned a content test; rather, the content
of "mundane commercial transactions" is now viewed as equally worthy of the protection
given "urgent political dialogue." 97 S. Ct. at 2699.
- 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
" Id. at 812-13.
" Id. at 820.
' 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
" 421 U.S. at 819.
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Justice Blackmun offered the following indicia of protectability: The speech contains "factual material of clear 'public
interest,'" communicates newsworthy information and opinion
of value to a diverse audience on matters pertaining to constitutional interests, and is legal. 9 These presumably would be guidelines for culling from the commercial context that speech worthy
of constitutional protection, such as information relating to abortion, civil rights, or politics.4"
In a later opinion, Justice Blackmun somewhat exaggerated
the effect of Bigelow by stating that in it "the notion of unprotected 'commercial speech' all but passed from the scene."'"
What Bigelow actually accomplished was the displacement of a
pure content determination of what is or is not protected speech.
Although the Court, following Sullivan, initially evaluated the
advertisement by its content, the case was decided by a balancing
analysis, wherein the right to speak and the public benefits were
weighed against the state's interest in regulating the speech.4 2
The introduction of a balancing test precluded the mechanical
assertion of either the pure content test of Sullivan, or the primary motive test of Valentine. This shift in methodology had the
effect of inviting a new argument that important constitutional
interests might exist in wholly commercial speech. Bigelow thus
put the Supreme Court on what Justice Rehnquist called "the
slippery slope"43 away from the commercial speech doctrine, and
blazed a trail for the genuine pioneering that would take place in
Virginia Pharmacy.
Another notable aspect of Bigelow was the shading of the
editor's press and speech freedoms into the public's interest in
receiving information. But the Bigelow approach seems primitive
11Id. at 821-22. That the abortion information was legal in New York was the Court's
toehold for distinguishing Bigelow from Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
0 For an extensive recent discussion of political speech, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976). See note 54 and text accompanying notes 53-56 infra.
" 425 U.S. at 759.
" The Court balanced Virginia's interest in maintaining the quality of medical care
against Bigelow's freedoms of speech and press, coupled with the public's interest in the
advertised information. Virginia's interest was given "little, if any, weight," because the
abortion clinic was in New York and thus did not adversely affect medical care in Virginia.
421 U.S. at 826-28.
" 97 S. Ct. at 2700.
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by contrast to the strong public interest rationale that was decisive in Virginia Pharmacy and Bates."
By holding that commercial form and purpose do not alone
undermine first amendment guarantees, Bigelow clarified
Sullivan's evasiveness about the commercial speech doctrine. But
Bigelow's analytical weaknesses were cognate with Sullivan's.
Their content tests have at least two serious drawbacks: the inconsistency of protecting commercially-motivated speech only
when it treats certain acceptable subject matter, and the burden
on courts to determine in each case what is or is not of public
interest. Bigelow took the necessary first step of dispelling any
notion that speech in commercial form was peremptorily beyond
the scope of the first amendment.45 It remained for Virginia Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council" to resolve
the issue of commercial content.
In Virginia Pharmacy a consumer group challenged a state
prohibiton against the advertisement of prescription drug prices.
The Court held that (1) Prescription drug consumers were entitled to the same first amendment protection as advertisers; (2)
advertising, regardless of content, did deserve first amendment
protection; and (3) even substantial state interests did not justify
the prohibition of the dissemination of drug price information.47
This combination of factors-that the listener's interest could
outweigh the state's, that first amendment protection would not
be accorded strictly on the basis of content, and that state claims
would be strictly scrutinized where they operated to curb commercial expression-created a formidable new weapon which, as
Bates demonstrated, would be capable of outlawing any wholesale suppression of commercial speech.
That the plaintiffs in Virginia Pharmacywere consumers was
a crucial factor in the decision." In Bigelow, the plaintiff was the
425 U.S. at 765; see, e.g., 97 S. Ct. at 2704.
,' Otherwise astute critics have failed to see that Bigelow was an important point of
departure. Professor Schiro wrote that Bigelow was "best viewed as an attempt to buttress
. . .the abortion decisions." Schiro, supra note 25, at 78. He even claimed that the case
"declared that commercial speech has no First Amendment status." Id. at 87.
", 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
" 425 U.S. at 756-57.
' Id. at 753. An unsuccessful action to invalidate the same statute had been brought
by pharmacists as frustrated potential advertisers several years earlier. Patterson Drug
Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969).
4'
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speaker-publisher, and the Court was forced to tailor its decision
to traditional first amendment theory regarding the rights of the
speaker and the press. In VirginiaPharmacy, however, the listeners'-consumers' rights to receive information had been violated;
thus the Court could directly engage the ideal of informed decisionmaking which had colored but not controlled the decision in
Bigelow. In Virginia Pharmacy Justice Blackmun asserted that
"the free flow of commercial information

. . .

is indispensable to

the formation of intelligent opinions."" With a direct reference to
the Meiklejohn theory and to Sullivan, Blackmun then suggested
that such information could well serve "to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy. '"" He pronounced that speech which
does "'no more than propose a commercial transaction' "-the
touchstone of the Valentine doctrine-does not necessarily lack
"all protection."'" In effect, commercial speech was promoted to
the status of public speech, and for public speech of any type
there would be one standard of review.
That standard was discussed at great length in Buckley v.
Valeo,5 which in part considered political information presented
in commercial form.53 Buckley's version of first amendment strict
scrutiny is based on the following premise: Even a substantial
government interest (in this instance, preventing public corruption) is an inadequate ground absent compelling justification, for
a regulation which "heavily burdens core First Amendment expression.

'4

The Court had traditionally reserved the method of

425 U.S. at 765.
Id. & n.19. For a discussion of the Meiklejohn theory, see text accompanying note
29 supra and text accompanying notes 123-27 infra.
1, Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). This language would appear to be a direct criticism of
the reasoning of that case, and its reliance on the commercial speech doctrine.
52 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The decison is 293 pages long.
3 Buckley held unconstitutional certain provisions of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971 which imposed ceilings on campaign expenditures by candidates, limited
independent political expenditures by individuals and groups, and limited candidates'
personal expenditures. The Court said these restrictions impermissibly burdened the right
of free expression and could not be sustained on the basis of governmental interests in
"

preventing corruption or in equalizing candidates' resources.
The Court characterized the test employed as "exacting scrutiny," id. at 16, and a
"rigorous standard of review," id. at 29. "The subordinating interests of the state must
survive exacting scrutiny." Id. at 64. The strict test was applied in detail to each provision
in issue; some succumbed and some survived.
" Id. at 48.
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exacting scrutiny for questions that turned on political expression, racial discrimination, access to justice, and other important
constitutional interests. Virginia Pharmacy'sreal doctrinal innovation was to apply this first amendment methodology to purely
commercial speech, when a mere minimum rationality test might
have been expected. 5
Precedents for the exacting scrutiny test in Buckley are found in United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); and NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
In O'Brien, a Vietnam War protester unsuccessfully challenged his conviction under
a provision of the Selective Service Act which made it a crime to burn or destroy a draft
card. Chief Justice Warren formulated the following test:
[A] government regulation [of speech] is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
391 U.S. at 377.
In Button the NAACP challenged a Virginia statute that made it an offense for an
organization to solicit business for an attorney. The NAACP had offered the services of
its legal staff for suits challenging racial discrimination. The Court held that the state
interest in prohibiting professional misconduct by attorneys was insufficient to justify the
state's abridgment of constitutional rights of expression and association. The Button strict
scrutiny analysis was phrased to require that broad prohibitions of protected first amendment activity be justified by a "substantial regulatory interest" in preventing
"substantive evils." 371 U.S. at 444. The Court noted that "[biroad prophylactic rules
in the area of free expression are suspect." Id. at 438.
Button differed from Bates in that it focused on litigation as political expression and
as the means to achieve equal treatment under the law. Solicitation was not regarded as
advertising but as group activity. Therefore, the holding had no actual precedential value
for Bates, except as an example of strict scrutiny in a closely related area.
NAACP v. Alabama held a state statute requiring organizations to disclose the identity of their members an unconstitutional abridgement of the members' first amendment
rights of free association. The statute was deemed to lack a "controlling justification"
for a "compelling" or "substantial" state interest. 357 U.S. at 463-66.
Other cases which have employed analyses which could be designated as strict scrutiny of first amendment violations include Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); Kusper v. Pointikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59
(1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 343 (1972); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305, 307 (1965); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
1 Under the minimum rationality test, if a regulation may reasonably be expected
to further a purpose legally within the state's purview, it can withstand constitutional
attack. For an extreme example in the freedom-of-expression context, see Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (the Court affirming Gitlow's conviction for advocating mass
labor strikes under New York Criminal Anarchy Statute on the ground that the statute
was not an unreasonable exercise of state police power).
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The Court theoretically continued to "balance" interests in
Virginia Pharmacy. However, as in other first amendment strict
scrutiny cases, the Court applied the balancing test with a decidedly libertarian cast, 5 weighting speech heavily and placing the
burden on the state to justify its suppression. Justice Blackmun
determined that three interests were furthered by advertising:
The consumer's interest in receiving information, the societal interest in the allocation of resources in a free enterprise system,
and the advertiser's interest in free expression.57 These he balanced against the state's regulatory interests, especially that of
"maintaining professionalism" 8 in the pharmaceutical business.
The state interests were characterized not as "compelling" but
nevertheless as "indisputably . . .strong."5 Justice Blackmun

described his analysis of whether the ban in fact furthered that
strong interest not as "strict scrutiny," but as "close inspection." 0
The analysis was indeed close. The Court found not only that
Virginia's justifications were patently insubstantial next to the
interests of the consumer, but that the likely effect of an advertising ban would be to protect the profits of inferior pharmacists'l-the opposite result from that claimed for the ban. The
analysis was completed with an implicit inquiry into whether the
restriction was "no greater than is essential" to the furtherance
of the state interest.62 The Court asserted that the ban was "a
protection based in large part on public ignorance,"" and was
certainly not the least restrictive alternative available for accomplishing that state purpose of maintaining professionalism.
But the Court hedged in several important ways in its analysis.4 The meaning of Blackmun's assertion that advertising mer" See note 96 infra.

7 425 U.S. at 762-65.
' Id. at 766.
59 Id.

0 Id. at 769.

I
Id.
Overbreadth is the last element in the four-part test in United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See note 54 supra. For a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine
as it colors Virginia Pharmacy see Note, Commercial Speech and the FirstAmendment,
6 CAP. U.L. R~v. 75, 88 (1975). But see note 73 infra and accompanying text: In Bates,
the overbreadth doctrine was expressly not applied. 97 S. Ct. at 2707.
" 425 U.S. at 769.
" See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HAv. L. REv. 142, 147 n.34 (1976). The
"
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ited a different degree of protection from other protected speech
is unclear. It could be read as signifying either less protection, in
the Valentine5 tradition, or simply different regulatory characteristics. It was difficult to discern from the opinion whether the
rigorous test could be correctly designated as strict scrutiny,
whether it would be applied in future commercial speech cases,
or to what infractions it would attach. Despite the stirring language in Virginia Pharmacy, the opinion remains ambiguous as
to what constitutional standard of review would be controlling in
the commercial speech area.
author identified Virgnia Pharmacy's test as strict scrutiny, but stressed its ambiguity:
"[Tlhe degree of rigor with which it will be applied in the future is uncertain. This is
particularly true of the 'compelling interest' component of the test."
Express exceptions to comprehensive protection for commercial speech were: (1) Advertising is subject to time, place, and manner restrictions (the bounds of which were left
completely undefined in both Virginia Pharmacyand Bates); (2) the electronic broadcast
media present "special problems"; (3) advertising is specially suited to regulation to
prevent untruth and deception because it is more verifiable than such speech as political
commentary. Commercial speech might warrant a "different degree of protection" than
does other speech in that: Advertisements may be required to appear in a certain form,
or to contain warnings, information, or disclaimers; prior restraint prohibitions may be
inapplicable; advertising regulations will be less susceptible to attack on the ground that
they "chill" speech. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. These exceptions were each incorporated into
the regulatory guidelines of Bates. See text accompanying notes 75-85 infra.
A fourth explicit hedge was the provocative footnote 25, now mooted by Bates. Its
salient language reads: "[W]e express no opinion as to other professions ....
Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not dispense standardized products, they render professional services . . . with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and deception
if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertising." 425 U.S. at 773 n.25. Footnote 25
may be the most curious episode in the checkered history of commercial speech. It added
enormously to the ambiguity of Virginia Pharmacy's holding. Its apparent expression of
disfavor with advertising professional services does not comport with the reasoning of the
case, and certainly did little to adumbrate Bates. One analyst has noted that footnote 25
did not even comport with Bigelow, which treated an advertisement for medical services.
See Note, Constitutional Law-Limitation of the Commercial Speech Exception to First
Amendment Protection, 51 TUL. L. Rxv. 149, 153-54 (1976).
There are several possible explanations for the inclusion of footnote 25. The Court
may have been genuinely undecided. The Court may have wanted to restrain lawyers from
immediately advertising on the strength of the holding. The Court may have wanted to
direct conspicuous attention to the issue, Considering Justice Stewart's and Chief Justice
Burger's hesitant commitments to the holding, footnote 25 was perhaps required to cement a majority. Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, in their dissents in Bates,
insisted on reading it according to its more obvious light: that advertising of commodities,
not services, merited protection. 97 S. Ct. at 2710, 2712. It seems certain that footnote
25-shrugged off by Justice Blackmun, and forming the principal thesis of the dissents-was the dividing point between the majority and minority in Bates.
" 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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Justice Rehnquist's image of a "slippery slope" 6 'suggests
that once the Court took the first tentative step away from
Valentine it was bound to lose its balance and tumble headlong
into the abyss of Bates. In fact the passage from Bigelow 7 to
Bates was an exceedingly orderly one, with each succeeding case
correcting and building on the doctrinal foundation laid by its
predecessor. An incremental process was probably required to
refine first amendment methodology to the point of being capable
of striking down bans against legal advertising. Sullivan5 and
Bigelow had responded to the failure of the primary motive test
to protect highly valued speech. But Bigelow's balancing test,
encumbered by the commercial speech doctrine, would have
proven unwieldy with any but the most compelling public speech.
Virginia Pharmacy resolved these inadequacies by eliminating
the commercial speech doctrine, and by modifying the balancing
process with strict scrutiny. But VirginiaPharmacy'sambiguities
still needed to be clarified, and its rigor tried.
The first opportunity to test the Virginia Pharmacy protections came with Linmark Associates v. City of Willingboro. 9
There the Court applied the new doctrine to a city ordinance
which prohibited homeowners from posting "For Sale" signs in
front of their houses. The municipality claimed that the ordinance would further stable, racially-integrated housing, the idea
being that a block littered with "For Sale" signs would provoke
panic selling by whites. Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous
Court, found that the ordinance restricted the flow of truthful
commercial information, was directed at the content of speech
rather than its time, place, or manner, 0 and as such was an
unconstitutional abridgment of first amendment rights.
11Justice Rehnquist himself is left on the summit, the lone supporter of the Valentine
doctrine, having dissented in Bigelow, Virginia Pharmacy, and Bates, and having not
particpated in Linmark.
67 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
6 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
- 97 S. Ct. 1614 (1977).
70 Id. at 1618-19. One commentator assessing the appellate court opinion, 535 F.2d
786 (3d Cir. 1976), assumed that the Supreme Court would treat the ordinance as a time,
place, and manner regulation. 11 GA. L. REv. 230 (1976). This comment is a good example
of how the ambiguity of the Virginia Pharmacy test could lead one astray. The author read
the test as conventional balancing and felt confident that the Willingboro ordinance would
survive based on the municipal interest in the stabilization of neighborhoods. But Virginia
Pharmacy had not proposed conventional balancing, and the ordinance in Linmark was
strictly scrutinized.
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Linmark expanded the protections accorded to advertising in
Virginia Pharmacy, and advanced the first amendment doctrine
which that case had announced for commercial speech. It is noteworthy that homeowners' and consumers' interests in commercial
information were strong enough to prevail over the traditionally
highly valued objective of integrated housing. Thus, the protected status of commercial speech was substantially fortified by
this case.
But by itself Linmark would have been weak precedent for
Bates: The ordinance arguably bore no relation to preventing
"white flight," and thus could have been stricken by a minimum
rationality test.7' The fact that Marshall seized the occasion to
apply an exacting scrutiny test in the name of Virginia Pharmacy
is accountable as part of the seriate development of protection for
commercial speech. When Justice Blackmun wrote Bates, all the
doctrinal tools necessary to a smooth and logical analysis were
available, and a majority of the Court stood ready to put aside
the most durable and problematical of the bans on advertising.
Linmark was a test run for a first amendment theory that was
about to come of age, a necessary flexing of new strength prior to
Bates.

II.
A.

ANALYSIS OF

Bates

The Holding

The holding in Bates was confined to its facts: The state may
not suppress truthful advertising of the availability and terms of
routine legal services.7 2 A narrow holding was required by the
Court's determination that the overbreadth doctrine did not
apply to commercial speech: Legal advertising regulations can be
attacked only as applied to the plaintiff's advertisement.7 3 But a
narrow holding also served the Court's purposes. It carried a clear
rejection of any across-the-board legal advertising ban, and it
7 See note 55 supra.
72 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
" Under the overbreadth doctrine, a plaintiff can challenge the constitutionality of
an entire regulation on the ground that it may sweep some protected speech into its
prohibitory scheme. Without the overbreadth doctrine, a plaintiff is limited to showing
that the regulation is unconstitutional as applied to him. Justice Blackmun argued that,
because advertisers "can determine more readily than others whether their speech is
truthful and protected," advertising regulations would not be likely to "chill" such
"verifiable" speech, and the overbreadth doctrine was therefore unnecessary. Id. at 2707.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 55

encouraged a creative response from the bar by allowing flexibility in promulgating new rules."
Justice Blackmun offered a series of suggestions as to the
permissible scope of new regulations: "[Riegulation to assure
truthfulness,"75 which might sweep too broadly in other areas,
such as libel,76 will be upheld for commercial speech. False, deceptive, or misleading advertising may be banned outright. Only
routine services may be advertised." Advertising claims as to the
quality of services apparently may be prohibited,78 but judgment
was reserved on "that issue for another day." 79 In-person solicitation will continue to be disallowed," illegal transactions may not
82
be advertised,"1 and warnings or disclaimers may be required.
Regulations of legal advertising in general will be free from attack
' Chief Justice Burger characterized the Court's opinion as "draconian." Id. at 2711
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Powell described it as the "imposition of hard and fast
constitutional rules." Id. at 2718 (Powell, J., dissenting). In view of the considerable
leeway the Court provided, these criticisms seem less than just.
" Id. at 2708-09.
,oSee Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Blackmun stressed that
advertising is "calculated," not "spontaneous" speech, and, as such, is susceptible to
specific restrictions against misleading content. 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
Id. at 2703.
' Blackmun's extension of this exception became a bit troublesome. He supposed
that "different degrees of regulation may be appropriate in different areas" depending on
the legal sophistication of the audience. Id. at 2709 n.37. He did not advise how to measure
sophistication or to separate audiences, and it remains difficult to see how legal advertisements in the National Enquirer might be subject to greater restrictions than those in the
Wall Street Journal.
" Id. at 2700. Blackmun's diction is interestingly qualified: "[W]e need notaddress
the peculiarproblems associated with advertising claims relating to the quality of legal
services. Such claims probably are not susceptible to precise measurement or verification
and, under some circumstances might well be deceptive or misleading to the public, or
even false." Id. (emphasis added and omitted). Conceivably, with language as guarded
as this, restrictions against some claims as to quality might be unconstitutional as applied.
N This exception was one of several ways the Bates reforms did not go as far as those
proposed in an important suggested revision of Canon 2 of the A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY. Note, Advertising, Soliciting, and the Profession's Duty to Make
Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181 (1972), cited in Bates, 97 S. Ct. at 2703 n.25.
The author of the note also would not have ruled out advertising of quality of services. As
a means of judging deceptive content, the author argued for using the Federal Trade
Commission opinions, with the usual FTC standard of protecting the credulous man
raised, for legal advertising, to protecting the reasonable man. 81 YALE L.J. at 1197. The
suggested reforms, thus, greatly exceed those of Bates.
1197 S. Ct. at 2709.
92

Id.

1978

LEGAL ADVERTISING

either on antitrust grounds 3 or by means of the overbreadth doctrine.
Justice Blackmun noted that "there may be reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of advertising, ' 84 but
offered no specifics other than the cryptic caveat that the "special
problems" of the broadcast media "will warrant special consideration." 5 The lack of time, place, and manner guidelines can inspire a "parade of horribles": 88 billboards opposite city jails or
emergency rooms, bus placards,87 skywriting, sandwich boards, or
neon facsimiles of the scales of justice announcing weekly specials. But it seems more likely that the bar's capacity for selfregulation has been not only clarified but also strengthened
through Bates."8 Blackmun's guidelines are far less detailed, for
example, than were those of Miller v. California" for obscenity
regulation, and, as obscenity litigation has shown, 0 this is perhaps just as well. The bar, after Bates, is left with a mandate to
reform and a free hand for doing so. Bates should certainly not
1 Id. at 2696-98. The Sherman Act claim that bans on legal advertising illegally
restrained trade was held barred by the "state action" exemption, enunciated in Parker
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), for acts of state governments from antitrust actions.
1 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
5 Id.
0 Justice Powell foresaw legal advertising in magazines, buses, and subways; through
posters, handbills, and mail circulations. Id. at 2718 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting). He
urged that time, place, and manner regulations can and should have "a significantly
broader reach with respect to professional services than as to standardized products." Id.
at 2717 (Powell, J., dissenting).
" See Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). Lehman might be exceedingly
difficult to reconcile with such a method of publication. See note 21 supra.
A few days prior to the Bates decision, the ABA Task Force on Lawyer Advertising
composed and circulated two alternative proposals for revising Canon 2 of the ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. After hearings held on August 4, 1977, the proposals were
submitted to the ABA Board of Governors, having been amended in light of Bates only
in that radio, but not television, was added as a permissible advertising medium. The
ABA House of Delegates followed the Board of Governors recommendation that Proposal
A be incorporated into the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrTY but that both
proposals be circulated to state bar associations and high courts for their consideration.
Proposal A has a negative thrust, described as "regulatory," in that it limits lawyers to
certain listed forms of advertising. Proposal B was termed "directive"; it allows for any
advertising that would not be misleading, and establishes guidelines for determining what
may be misleading. 63 A.B.A.J. 1234 (1977). On December 29, 1977, the Colorado Supreme Court adopted Proposal A, with certain modifications (including permitting television advertising). The full text of Colorado's new DR 2-101 is reprinted in Appendix II.
" 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
" See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 94-101 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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produce the earthshaking consequences feared by the dissenters
and by certain commentators,9 1 and probably will encourage advertising primarily on the Bates and O'Steen model.
But an intriguing aspect of the opinion is the forcefulness
with which Blackmun urged these rather moderate reforms. He
frankly disparaged the ABA's revision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, in which the bar somewhat relaxed its long aversion to attorney advertising. 2 He called on the bar to play a
special role "in assuring that advertising by attorneys flows both
freely and cleanly. 9 3 And the major portion of the opinion was
occupied with unexampled criticism of the conventional wisdom
comprising the legal profession's objections to advertising.
B.

Methodology

The opinion can be separated into seven parts: The facts, the
9" a conantitrust issue, a lengthy summary of Virginia Pharmacy,
sideration of the state's reasons for prohibiting legal advertising,
a dismissal of the overbreadth doctrine, a consideration of
whether Bates' and O'Steen's advertisement was misleading, and
guidelines for new rules. Discounting the recital of facts and the
antitrust issue, two-thirds of the opinion was taken up with a
rigorous examination of the bar's reasons for banning attorney
advertising.
5
As Justice Blackmun noted, Bates proceeds "a fortiori""
" Justice Powell wrote that "today's decision will effect profound changes in the
practice of law." 97 S. Ct. at 2712 (Powell, J., dissenting). A news magazine warned that
"Ithe legal profession faces an era of change, the likes of which it has rarely, if ever
encountered." U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 11, 1977, at 21.
" The Court remarked of the 1976 ABA revision: "[An advertising diet limited to
such spartan fare would provide scant nourishment." 97 S. Ct. at 2701. The revised
disciplinary rule permits attorneys to list, in a "law list," legal directory, or in the yellow
pages of the telephone book, information including the following: The fee for an initial
consultation, and the availability upon request of a fee schedule or fee estimates; availability of credit; the specialties of the attorney and his firm; the names of references and
clients; and various professional credentials. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
D.R. 2-102(A)(6) (1976).
One possible reason for the explicit criticism of the ABA may have been to put to
rest complaints that current and future ABA reforms represent "less drastic alternatives"
than striking advertising bans as unconstitutional. That is, Justice Blackmun was forced
to label the ABA revisions inadequate. See 97 S. Ct. at 2711 (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
id. at 2716-17 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"1 97 S.Ct. at 2709.
91 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
,197 S.Ct. at 2700.
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from Virginia Pharmacy. That case had emphasized the individual and societal interests in the free flow of information to the
public and had employed a strict scrutiny test to evaluate regulations which impinged on those interests. The form of the Court's
decision was that of a balancing test; in effect, however, the Court
heavily loaded the scales in favor of the public's right to information, causing the ballast to shift to the side of speech." This
methodology, and the first amendment doctrine underlying it,
resulted in a strict scrutiny test for regulations that burdened the
availability of commercial information to the public.
As applied in Bates, the strict scrutiny analysis required that
(1) the "justifications"9 7 for suppressing the flow of information
be "acceptable,"" and (2) the state interest served be "strong." ' ,
The word "acceptable" carries an almost deliberate ambiguity.
But the opinion established that "acceptability," whatever it
means, is a difficult standard to meet. In fact, the Court suggested that where there has been "blanket suppression"'' 0 of
speech that is of value to consumers, perhaps no justification
would be acceptable.'"'
In Goldfarb v. Virginia the Court had already recognized that
"[t]he interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially
" It was Justice Harlan's view that all first amendment speech cases should be
resolved according to a balancing test. Harlan stated the balancing test simply as "a
balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests." Barenblatt v.
United. States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959). In fact, Harlan preferred to ballast his scales in
favor of the government in first amendment speech cases. See, e.g., Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Barenblatt.
Justice Black consistently maintained that a balancing test was entirely inappropriate for first amendment adjudication. In a direct reply to Justice Harlan's "balancing,"
Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, countered that he did
not agree that "laws directly abridging First Amendment freedoms can be justified by a
congressional or judicial balancing process." 360 U.S. at 141 (Black, J., dissenting).
" 97 S. Ct. at 2701.
" Id. at 2707.
"Id. at 2699.
' Id. at 2708.
101 There are two tests in Bates: The strict scrutiny of the general ban on advertising,
and a test for whether the regulation was unconstitutional as applied. The latter test
simply evaluates whether the advertisement's information is misleading. If it is not misleading (as with the Bates-O'Steen ad), it is protected. Justice Blackmun dismissed three
challenges to the Bates-O'Steen ad: That the words "legal clinic" were misleading; that
the words "very reasonable" unjustifiably implied bargain prices; and that the advertisement did not inform the consumer that he may obtain a name change without the services
of an attorney. Id.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 55

great.
...
"I0 It remained for Justice Blackmun to assess the
acceptability of the Arizona bar's justifications for serving that
interest through a ban on attorney advertising. The Court's willingness to inveigh against the state's justifications for the restriction is worthy of attention.
The first of the six justifications asserted by the state was the
need to maintain professionalism, the same point argued in
Virginia Pharmacy.0 3 It was claimed that attorneys' pride, dignity, and "obligation selflessly to serve" would be adversely affected by advertising," ' and that advertising would demonstrate
to clients that lawyers were in fact motivated by profit and not
purely by "a commitment to the clients' welfare."' 15 But Justice
Blackmun suggested that the argument was not a little disingenuous:
[W]e find the postulated connection between advertising and the
erosion of true professionalism to be severly strained. At its core, the
argument presumes that attorneys must conceal from themselves
and from their clients the real-life fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at the bar. We suspect that few attorneys engage in such selfdeception.100

With this observation, Justice Blackmun struck the tone that
characterizes his entire treatment of the bar's argument: suspicious, even accusatory, occasionally ironic to the point of persi07
flage.
102421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). Evidently, the state interests were greater in Bates than

they had been in Virginia Pharmacy. Bates is consequently the stronger establishment of
consumers' rights against the state. Some commentators had predicted that this phrase
from Goldfarb would prevent the Court from striking legal advertising bans. See, e.g., De
Soto, Advertising and the Legal Profession, 6 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L. REv. 67, 87 (1976).
"0

425 U.S. 748 (1976).
97 S. Ct. at 2701.

105 Id.
106Id.

The Court had this to say about the bar's argument that dishonest lawyers will
abuse an advertising privilege: "It is at least somewhat incongruous for the opponents of
advertising to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal profession at one point, and, at
another, to assert that its members will seize the opportunity to mislead and distort." Id.
at 2707. The Court accuse the bar of hypocrisy: "[Clynicism with regard to the profession
may be created by the fact that it long has publicly eschewed advertising, while condoning
the actions of the attorney who structures his social or civic associations so as to provide
contacts with potential clients." Id. at 2702. The bar's implicit connecting of advertising
with barratry received this rebuttal: "Although advertising might increase the use of the
judicial machinery, we cannot accept the notion that it is always better for a person to
suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal action." Id. at 2705.
107
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That attorney advertising is inherently misleading was the
bar's strongest justification for continuing the ban on attorney
advertising. The argument stated that legal services are too individualized, too dependent on a lawyer's particular skills, and too
unknowable in advance to be advertised without being deceptive.'0 8 Justice Blackmun countered that routine legal services
lack those disadvantages, and that only routine legal services will
be advertised. Also, even if an advertisement cannot present a
complete picture of services available, some information is better
than none.
The next justification was that advertising would increase
litigation. Justice Blackmun responded with statistics which indicated that legal services are under-utilized, and he urged that
advertising would be a means to facilitate access to the legal
profession for that seventy percent of the population not adequately served by it.'"0 Next, the Court considered, and dismissed
as unfounded, the argument that advertising would result in
higher fees. 1 0 Another claim was that advertising would harm the
quality of legal work by encouraging cutrate "package" service in
place of individual attention."' Justice Blackmun rejected the
point perhaps a bit cavalierly, noting that "[a]n attorney who
is inclined to cut quality will do so regardless of the rule on advertising,""' and that standardized services are not necessarily inferior services. Finally he addressed an argument made much of by
the principal dissenter: Oversight of advertising will impose severe and unmanageable administrative burdens on the state."'
Justice Blackmun responded with a confidence in the "integrity
and honor" of the profession not to abuse its new privilege." 4
The running theme of the Court's analysis was that times
have changed and the profession must follow. Complementing
the conclusion that the bar's justifications were almost uniformly
factitious were a countertone of faith in the public to make its
own decisions wisely and persuasive reasoning that legal advertis1o*Id. at 2703.
Id. at 2705.
Id. at 2705-06.
"'Id.at 2706.
"'

"'

Id.
,"' Id. at
112

2711 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2715-16 (Powell, J., dissenting).
1' Id. at 2707.
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ing will in fact be salutary. The conclusions were also supported
by a wealth of extrinsic data, on the order of a Brandeis brief,
which catalogued the inadequacies of legal services and the benefits of advertising, and included a brief history of attorney advertising bans. The result is a finely-wrought opinion, persuasively
skeptical of the purposes behind restricting speech, backed by
sociological and historical data, and redounding finally into an
article of faith in consumers' rights.
C.

First Amendment Philosophy

The debate over attorney advertising inescapably translates
into a philosophical dispute over the proper relationship between
the people and those who govern the people. One view is characterized by faith in the people to make the correct decision if they
have access to the correct information. This view is epitomized
by Justice Blackmun's eloquent response to the bar's argument
that attorney advertising is inherently misleading:
[Tihe argument assumes that the public is not sophisticated
enough to realize the limitations of advertising, and that the public
'is better kept in ignorance than trusted with correct but incomplete
information. We suspect the argument rests on an underestimation
of the public. In any event, we view as dubious any justification that
is based on the benefits of public ignorance. . . . [Tihe preferred
remedy is more disclosure, rather than less." 5

The contrary view is epitomized by Justice Powell's dissent
in Bates, wherein he questioned whether the public should receive information of this nature. The dissenters' position distills
into two main arguments: (1) Consumers' rights to information
are "marginal" at best, and (2) of greater importance than the
consumer's right is the state's right in not having its administrative machinery overburdened by the regulation of attorney advertising."' By contrast, the majority, while not gainsaying the importance of state regulatory interests, elevated the consumer's
right to be informed to a special position, the abuse of which
would engage the vigorous scrutiny of "acceptability."
The theories behind the majority and the dissent can be
characterized as utilitarian. Both purport to strive for the greatest good to the greatest number, and both call for an adjustment

"'

I, at 2704.
Id.
Id. at 2717-19 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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of first amendment philosophy to reach that goal. Both positions
would reject the absolutist view of the first amendment advanced
by Justice Black," 7 as well as Justice Douglas' arguments for an
inherent right of free expression."' A utilitarian view lies in back
of any balancing process but comes particularly to the fore in
what has been called the first amendment's "majoritarian" context," 9 where it is not the interests of a minority (as in equal
protection cases) or of a speaker that are being attended, but
those of the public itself. But the majority and the dissent would
undertake the protection of the public in fundamentally different
ways. The one view expressed a profound faith in the wisdom of
the people, and the other, a profound faith in the wisdom of the
government to act beneficently for the people.
The minority expounded a narrow utilitarianism by which
the greatest good for the greatest number would be accomplished
by leaving undiminished the state's power to regulate. In the legal
advertising context, this view is reflected in Justice Powell's argument that the public is best served when certain of its interests
are entrusted to the organized legal profession. Justice Powell
wrote: "As a result [of the average person's lack of legal knowledge], the type of advertising before us inescapably will mislead
many who respond to it. In the end, it will promote distrust of
lawyers and disrespect for our own system of justice."' 2 Chief
Justice Burger put it more bluntly: "[Tihe public needs protection from the unscrupulous or the incompetent practitioner anxious to prey on the uninformed."'' The Bates reforms, which may
corrode the traditional authority and dignity of social institutions
such as the organized bar, are to be abjured.
"7See

Black, The Bill of Rights and the Federal Government, in THE GREAT RIGHTS

43 (Cahn ed. 1963).
"I See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
has discussed the distinction between Justice Douglas' and Justice Black's "individualist"
philosophies of the first amendment, and the utilitarian approach. Rehnquist, The First
Amendment: Freedom, Philosophy, and the Law, 12 GONZ. L. REv. 1 (1976).
M'See, e.g., Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976
U. OF ILL. L.F. 1080.
'2 97 S. Ct. at 2714 (Powell, J., disssenting).
"I Id. at 2711 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice proposed a less drastic
alternative: The bar can have "programs" which would announce the "range" of fees of
"truly routine" services. But such a range of fees may well (despite Chief Justice Burger's
claims to the contrary, id. n.2) operate as a minimum fee schedule rather than as a
catalyst to competition.
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The Bates majority adopted a broad utilitarian philosophy,
arguing that the public would be benefited most when benefited
directly, pursuing the ideal of an enlightened, self-sufficient citizenry. The people, thus, are most effectively served by increasing
the information for, and encouragement of, independent decisionmaking. The first amendment is an imperative prescribing the
widest possible dissemination of information and ideas.
The thesis that the first amendment is different in kind from
the rest of the Bill of Rights draws on an honorable tradition going
back to Oliver Wendell Holmes2 2 and Thomas Jefferson. Under
this view, the primary function of the first amendment is not to
protect the minority from the tyranny of the majority, but to
upgrade the working of a majoritarian democracy by mandating
the free exchange of ideas. The most effective recent advocate of
this theory was Alexander Meiklejohn. 121 Meiklejohn argued that
the Constitution was conceived in response to the people's wish
to govern themselves. The first amendment was the cynosure of
that ambition. About its axis were certain "governing powers' 21 4
effectuating not private rights but governmental responsibilities.
The state should be absolutely prevented from regulating within
the orbit of these powers, which included freedom to vote and
the right to be free of any governmental intrusion whatsoever into
education, philosophy, science, literature, the arts, or the free
flow of political information.12 5 Essential to this view of the first
I" Holmes' metaphor for this idea-the marketplace of ideas-is quite familiar, if
somewhat banal. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). More elaborate statements of similar notions have been made by Milton, Voltaire,
and John Stuart Mill. Most poetic perhaps was Mao Tse-Tung's flowerbed of ideas: "Let
a hundred flowers blossom. Let a hundred schools of thought contend." Speech by Mao
Tse-Tung, Peking (Feb. 27, 1957).
'2 See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT.Rav. 245; A.
MEIKLEJOHN, POLrrIcAL FREEDOM (1960).
1' Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245, 254.
The effect of the Meiklejohn approach would be to abandon the clear-and-present-danger
test (also advocated by T. E. Emerson. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 911 (1963)), and all other first amendment balancing when
public issues were the subject of the speech.
"I Meiklejohn, supra note 124, at 262. Meiklejohn had some difficulty conferring the
cachet of absolute protection on great literature. A system that would naturally favor any
political tract over Shakespeare must be in need of some refining. As Professor Redish
asked, "[I1s the performance of the political function the real reason we find it desirable
to protect great literature . . .?"Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 437
(1971).

LEGAL ADVERTISING

amendment as "an absolute" was the derogation of "private
speech" not connected to activities of "governing importance."
Meiklejohn did not conceive of advertising as an activity by
which we govern ourselves in a democracy.'26 Blackmun disagreed, and in so doing illuminated a blind spot in the Meiklejohn
vision. Blackmun perceived the flow of commercial information
as a serious matter of public affairs, to be valued according to the
Meiklejohn theory that society benefits from the spreading of
information and opinion. While the absolute protection Meiklejohn proposed was not considered, his vision of a freely informed
polity, and his ideal of self-government carried the day in Bates.
The Meiklejohn thesis, epitomized in his famous statement that
"[p]olitical freedom is not the absence of government. It is selfgovernment,""' is,of course, a theory of political freedom. But it
becomes a canon of consumerism when applied to economic freedom, as it was in Bates.
Professor Redish, in an article which criticized Meiklejohn
for not applying his thesis to the commercial speech area, effectively anticipated Bates six years before it was written.' 8 Redish
argued that commercial speech, unlike the other unprotected
types (fighting words, libel, obscenity, incitement), does no direct
damage to state interests.'2 9 Furthermore, advertising has important social uses in that it is informational; it increases consumer
sophistication; it promotes efficient use of time and effort by the
consumer; and, as it provides grounds for choosing one product
over another, it aids rational choice.'30 Redish argued generally for
"the belief in the intelligent free will of the individual, who is
capable of listening, thinking, reasoning, and, on the basis of
those activities, making his personal decision as to how he should
be governed."'' And the individual "asserts his dignity most
strikingly when he uses his power of reason to decide how his life

"'Both Meiklejohn and his peer as a first amendment theorist, T. E. Emerson,
blithely accepted without question the notion that commercial speech is entitled to less
protection than political speech. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLrrICAL FREEDOM 37 (1960); Emerson,
supra note 124, at 949 n.3.
"2 Meiklejohn, supra note 124, at 253.
I" Redish, supra note 125, at 431.
"2 Id. at 432-34.
13 Id.
M'

Id. at 441.
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first amendment, therefore, should protect information important to daily decisions in individuals' personal affairs. Although
great literature and "perhaps" political debate add somewhat
more to the process of rational development, ,33 advertising should
no longer be berated as less-protected speech.
One might note with irony that the more noble intellectual
pursuits-art, literature, philosophy, the "public discussion of
public issues" 34-have received no special solicitude from the
Burger Court, while advertising has. One might detect in Bates
an economic rationale suggestive of freedom of contract. Indeed,
in Virginia Pharmacy'35 and Bates, Blackmun added to the balance a societal interest in the free enterprise system. The Court's
philosophy in these cases appears to echo Adam Smith: A bargain
struck between A and B will benefit A, B, and society in general,
and the "invisible hand" of the market is all the regulation that
the conduct of those who sell and buy requires.138 But, although
some members of the Burger Court doubtless may wish to dissociate their reasoning from what could be thought of as libertarian
elitism, it should be remembered that the gravamen of the protections of Virginia Pharmacy and Bates is not the advertiser's
right to trade freely, but the consumer's right to information. The
economic philosophy that presides over these cases is not laissezfaire capitalism but consumerism, and the goals of the two often
conflict.
Bates also might be viewed as encouraging the notion of an
affirmative right of access to the media. 137 The proponents of this
theory, which is based on listeners' rights to hear the "robust
debate" of public issues, as reflected in Sullivan'38 and Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,'3 advert to the need for government
32
"
134

12

'1'

Id. at 442.
Id. at 444.
Meiklejohn, supra note 124, at 257.
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE

(1952) (No. 39,

AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

194

GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD).

,3 See Barron, Access-The Only Choice for the Media?, 48 TEx. L. REv. 766 (1970);
Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641

(1967).
'u 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
395 U.S. 367 (1969).
13'
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intervention to guarantee fair coverage of all public issues and a
lively interchange of competing ideas. The concept relies on a
substructure of listeners' rights 40 that would also support the
consumerism of Virginia Pharmacy and Bates. But positive government interference with a speaker's discretion in saying what
he wants seems an ominous warping of the spirit of the first
amendment from which the latter two cases stand wholly apart.
Instead, Bates accords with the traditional model of using
the first amendment to undo government interference with the
free flow of communication. The innovation of the line of cases
studied here was that the public's interests, not the speaker's,
inspired the Court's activism. Rather than an affirmative use of
the first amendment as a "sword" in government's regulatory
scabbard, Bates' freedom of expression operated as a shield for
consumers against government regulations.
Bates expressed the classic democratic idealism of the Bill of
Rights. Justice Blackmun's credo of trust in the people, with
society's duty being to inform them rather than to keep them in
ignorance,' is resonant with a Jeffersonian timbre. The Bates
philosophy of the first amendment, distilled to its essence, can be
found in these words of Jefferson:
"I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but
the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough
to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is
not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education."' 42

Baine Kerr
See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (dicta); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965).
"
See text accompanying note 115 supra.
42

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820)
JEFFERSON'S LETrERs 338-39). In the following passage, Jefferson could have

(WHITMAN,

been speaking (from his Enlightenment bias) of the minority and majority opinions in
Bates:

Men by their constitutions are naturally
those who fear and distrust the people, and
them into the hands of the higher classes.
themselves with the people, have confidence

divided into two parties, first,
wish to draw all powers from
Secondly, those who identify
in them, cherish and consider

them as the most honest and safe, although not the most wise depository of
the public interests. In every country these two parties exist and in every one

where they are free to think, speak, and write, they will declare themselves.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (Aug. 10, 1824) (S. PADOVER, A JEFFERSON
PROFILE 336 (1956)).
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APPENDIX I
DVERTISEMENT7

DO YOU NEED
A LAWYER?
LEGAL SERVICES
AT VERYREASONABLEFEES

LEGAL SERVICES AT
REASONABLE RATES

ItcLreIc CINC~
&Nr. ToATTrim
0 WrrhtV
NL 1

rV1

_VAS

kt K

I~I

Telephone: (303) 399-1701
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE,
uncontested with no disagreement as to
property division, maintenance, child custody
and support.

$150
. 175

,es
s..t... .....

wit.o,,s .io.,.

Wit S*o"
,ionAW- . ...............
Theobonechorges donot include $27 CourtS
filig oe
andcols. nictipoces

" Divorce

or legal separation--uncontested

[both spouses sign papers)

S175L00 plus 12000 court filng fee
" Preparation ot all court papers and instruc.
lions on how to do your own simple
uncontested divorce
1100.00
o

Adoption--uncontested severance proceeding

SIMPLE WILL,
pertr.eo..t ..............

$45

DRIVING UNDER INFLUENCE,
..OW.do .Wtsp.l scr . .

............

150

BANKRUPTCY,
indwidoo, nsn-hbsisess.
osieo und. $5.000. n
wefonte
ed .........
PtsSS5Co. Ifilg fees

20

Isto
regarding *t0htpe of cases wi be
tusnhed upon equest. The o.. qoted wets. eseew
wirit th Cityand Cosoty ors.

1225.00 Plus aproximately 11000 publicalion Cost

Rankruptcy-.non-business. no contested pro.
ceedings
Individual
1250.00 plus $55 00 court flhng lee
Wife and Husband
$300.00 plus $110.00 court filng tee
o Change of Name
o

595.00 plus 120.00 court filing lee

NEED AN ATTORNEY?
THE SILVERN LEGAL CLINIC
IS PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE ITS FEES
DIVORCES

1200

Information regarding other types of cases
furnished on request

Legal Clinic of Bates & O'Steen
617 North 3rd Stre
Phoeni. Arizena IS0
Telephone (60212124186

BANKRUPTCY

Ness. ds.wta,W

, 125

en,-

.s..,

285

~200
DEFENSEOF DRUNK DRIVING
.OR DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION
,enh
te

so...

PERSONAL INJURY
CONTINGENCY FEES

200

24%,
24 %os.eot s.t

325

27%,..s.os..

.. ,

30%e.s.eos
Information regarding other types of cases furnished on request.

Bates' and O'Steen's advertisement, which appeared in the
Arizona Republic, February 22,
1976.

THE SILVERN LEGAL CLINIC
1711 Faoy to, Sell. 202
beesn, Colorado11013

FOR AN APPOINTMENT CALL 861-8426
Soh-doy oppoonorts o-iloblo

Two advertisements which were placed 72
hours after Bates was announced, and
appeared in the Rocky Mountain News, July
1, 1977, at 32, 26.
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APPENDIX II

The following amendments to DR 2-101 of Canon 2 of the
Colorado Code of Professional Responsibility were adopted by the
Colorado Supreme Court December 29, 1977, and were made
effective January 2, 1978.* They incorporate the ABA's Proposal
A for amending Canon 2 (see note 88 supra) with modifications
which include the following' Television advertising is permitted
in Colorado (paragraph B); in-person solicitation is expressly prohibited (paragraph J); fee listings. must include mention of factors which might affect such fees (paragraph B(14)(f)); apparently DR 2-101 is exclusive in that lawyers may advertise only in
the manner described therein (paragraph H). In addition, the
Colorado Supreme Court, among other changes, added a detailed
and rather restrictive definition of "legal clinic" to the
"Definitions" section of Canon 2 (not reprinted here).
DR 2-101 Publicity.
(A) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner,
associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his
firm, use or participate in the use of any form of public
communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim.
(B) In order to promote the process of informed selection of
a lawyer by potential consumers of legal services, a lawyer may publish in print media or broadcast on radio or
television, subject to DR 2-103, the following information in the geographic area or areas in which the lawyer
resides or maintains offices or in which a significant
part of the lawyer's clientele resides, provided that the
information disclosed by the lawyer in such publication
or broadcast complies with DR 2-101(A) and is presented in a dignified manner:
(1) name, including name of law firm and names of
lawyers therein;
(2) addresses and telephone numbers;
(3) a statement of one or more fields of law in which
the lawyer or law firm practices, or a statement
that the practice is limited to one or more fields
of law;
*

Lawyer Advertising: Amendments to Canon 2, 7 COLO. LAWYER 189 (1978).
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a statement that the lawyer or law firm engages
in the general practice of law, which may be accompanied by a statement indicating one or more
fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm does
not practice;
(5) a statement that the lawyer or law firm specializes in a particular field of law practice to the
extent permitted by rules of the Colorado Supreme Court;
(6) date of birth;
(7) date and place of admission to the bar of any state
or federal court, U.S. territory, District of Columbia, or foreign country, provided that if the terms
of such admission contain restrictions thereon,
the nature of such restrictions shall also be disclosed;
(8) schools attended, with dates of graduation and
degrees;
(9) technical and professional licenses;
(10) foreign language ability;
(11) prepaid or group legal services programs in which
the lawyer participates;
(12) a statement as to whether credit cards or other
credit arrangements are accepted;
(13) office and other hours of availability;
(14) legal fee information limited to the following:
(a) fees charged for an initial consultation;
(b) the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to
be charged for the specific service or the
availability of a written schedule of fees for
group legal service organizations;
(c) hourly rates, provided that the statement
discloses that the total fee charged will depend upon the number of hours which must
be devoted to a particular matter and that
the client is entitled, without obligation, to
an estimate of the fee likely to be charged;
(d) fixed fees for routine legal services which are
specified therein, such as simple wills, a
change in name, an uncontested personal
(4)
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bankruptcy, an uncontested adoption, and
an uncontested dissolution of marriage;
(e) range of fees for services, provided that the
statement discloses that the specific fee
within such range will vary depending upon
the client's particular matter and that the
client is entitled, without obligation, to a
written estimate of the fee within the range
likely to be charged;
(f) a statement that contingent fee rates or
schedules are available upon request;
provided that any such printed legal fee information, including that which is printed on television,
discloses (in print size equivalent to the largest
print used in setting forth the fee information) all
variables and other relevant factors which could
affect such fee;
(C) Any person desiring to expand the information authorized for disclosure in DR 2-101(B), may apply to the
Colorado Supreme Court for an amendment to DR 2101(B) to permit such expansion. Any such application
shall also be served upon any entity or committee so
designated by the Colorado Supreme Court, which shall
be heard, together with the applicant, on the issue.
(D) All advertisements in their entirety shall be retained by
the lawyer for a period of three years following the publication or broadcast of such advertisement and upon
five days' request shall be produced and delivered to the
Colorado Supreme Court, any Justice thereof, or that
Court's Grievance Committee or other designated committee. If the advertisement is communicated over
radio or television, it shall be prerecorded, approved for
broadcast by the lawyer, and a recording, audio tape,
videotape or comparable method of retention shall be
maintained by the lawyer. If the advertisement is published in a newspaper of general circulation, the lawyer
shall maintain a record of the text of the advertisement
and dates of publication, in lieu of maintaining copies
of.each and every issue of the particular publication.
(E) If a lawyer renders legal services for which a fee had
been advertised, the lawyer must render that service for
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no more than the advertised fee.
(F) If a lawyer publishes any fee information authorized
under DR 2-101(B) in a publication that is published
more frequently than one time per month, the lawyer
shall be bound by any representation made therein for
a period of not less than 30 days after such publication.
If a lawyer publishes any fee information authorized
under DR 2-101(B) in a publication that is published
once a month or less frequently, such lawyer shall be
bound by any representation made therein until the
publication of the succeeding issue. If a lawyer publishes any fee information authorized under DR 2101(B) in a publication which has no fixed date for publication of a succeeding issue, the lawyer shall be bound
by any representation made therein for a reasonable
period of time after publication but in no event less
than one year.
(G) Unless otherwise specified, if a lawyer broadcasts any
fee information authorized under DR 2-101(B), the lawyer shall be bound by any representation made therein
for a period of not less than 30 days after such broadcast.
(H) Except to the extent permitted in DR 2-101, a lawyer
shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate,
or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a
lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements,
radio or television announcements, display advertisements in city or telephone directories, or other means of
commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit
others to do so in his behalf. However, a lawyer recommended by, paid by or whose legal services are furnished by, a qualified legal assistance organization may
authorize or permit or assist such organization to use
means of dignified commercial publicity, which does
not identify any lawyer by name, to describe the availability or nature of its legal services or legal service benefits. This does not prohibit limited and dignified identification of a lawyer as well as by name:
(1) In political advertisements when his professional
status is germane to the political campaign or to
a political issue.
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(2)

In public notices when the name and profession
of a lawyer are required or authorized by law or
are reasonably pertinent for a purpose other than
the attraction of potential clients.
(3)
In routine reports and announcements of a bona
fide business, civic, professional, or political organization in which he serves as a director or officer.
(4)
In and on legal documents prepared by him.
(5)
In and on legal textbooks, treatises, and other
legal publications, and in dignified advertisements thereof.
(6)
In communications by a qualified legal assistance
organization, along with the information permitted under DR 2-101(B) and DR 2-101(A)(5), directed to a member or beneficiary of such organization.
(I) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value
to representatives of the press, radio, television, or other
communication media in anticipation of or in return for
professional publicity in a news item.
(J) Unless specifically authorized under DR 2-101(B) or DR
2-104, in-person or other direct solicitation of business
is prohibited.

